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We investigated 4th-grade children’s search strategies on sequential search tasks in which
the goal is to identify an unknown target object by asking yes–no questions about its fea-
tures. We used exhaustive search to identify the most efﬁcient question strategies and
evaluated the usefulness of children’s questions accordingly. Results show that children
have good intuitions regarding questions’ usefulness and search adaptively, relative to
the statistical structure of the task environment. Search was especially efﬁcient in a task
environment that was representative of real-world experiences. This suggests that children
may use their knowledge of real-world environmental statistics to guide their search
behavior. We also compared different related search tasks. We found positive transfer
effects from ﬁrst doing a number search task on a later person search task.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Often inferences and decisions must be made before all
relevant information can be obtained. In these situations,
careful selection of questions to ask (or queries to make
or experiments to conduct) is very important. Examples in-
clude a child asking a question to learn the meaning of a
novel word, a scientist choosing an experiment to differen-
tiate between competing hypotheses, or a person’s visual
system directing the eyes’ gaze to informative parts of a vi-
sual scene.
How do children and adults search for information?
Many studies investigating information search have usedvariants of the ‘‘20-questions’’ game. In this game, the task
is to identify an unknown target item by asking as few yes–
no (binary) questions as possible. Much research has fo-
cused on the frequency of different kinds of questions in
different age groups (Denney & Denney, 1973; Eimas,
1970; Mosher & Hornsby, 1966; Ruggeri & Feufel, submit-
ted for publication; Thornton, 1982). Younger children
tend to ask about speciﬁc objects (hypothesis-testing ques-
tions, e.g., ‘‘Is it Paul?’’), or questions that, while phrased in
terms of constraints, in fact pertain to individual objects
(pseudoconstraint questions). An example would be asking
‘‘Does the person have a beard?’’ when there is only one
person with a beard in the set. Older children tend to ask
about properties that differentiate between subsets of
multiple objects (constraint questions, e.g., ‘‘Is the person
wearing a hat?’’). Interestingly, one study found that el-
derly adults (Mage = 83) required 32 questions, whereas
younger adults (Mage = 38) required only 18 questions on
a related task (Denney & Denney, 1973).
We study information search in fourth-grade
(8–10 year old) children, an age in which they begin to
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gler & Stern, 1998) and playing games (Amit & Jan, 2006).
They also develop skill at comparing simple proportions
(Fischbein, Pampu, & Minzat, 1970; Martignon & Krauss,
2009; Tourniaire & Pulos, 1985). We investigate children’s
sensitivity to the varying usefulness of constraint ques-
tions in different environments.
1.1. Theoretical background and the Person Game
The goal in the Person Game, which we analyze mathe-
matically and use in our experiment, is to identify an un-
known target person by asking as few yes–no questions
about the person’s features as possible. This equates to
ﬁnding the question tree (binary decision tree) that has
the smallest expected total number of questions. A ques-
tion tree speciﬁes which question is asked ﬁrst, and
depending on the answer to that question, what question
is asked next, and so on (Fig. 1). In the Person Game, the
available questions correspond to 20 physical features of
the cartoon faces. The possible people are equally probable
a priori. Suppose that the question is whether the (un-
known) person is wearing a hat. If the answer is ‘‘no’’, all
persons with hats can be eliminated; if the answer is
‘‘yes’’, all persons without hats can be eliminated. For largeFig. 1. Task environments and optimal decision trees in the Person Game. In b
identify the optimal question tree. In the Representative Environment (top left)
Environment (top right), Beard is the most informative ﬁrst question. (The Germa
beard, mustache, or chin-only beard.) The trees below the stimuli show the op
Environment (bottom left) and for the Nonrepresentative Environment (bottom
answer is ‘‘no’’ one takes the left branch; if the answer is ‘‘yes’’ one takes the riproblems, such as person games with large numbers of
people, it can be infeasible to use exhaustive search (which
is NP-complete; Hyaﬁl & Rivest, 1976) to identify the opti-
mal question tree. We therefore also discuss stepwise
information gain (Cover & Thomas, 1991; Lindley, 1956;
Oaksford & Chater, 1996, 2003), a statistical model that is
computationally simpler to implement. The highest-infor-
mation-gain question is the question that, in the expecta-
tion after the question’s answer is known, will lead to
lowest expected posterior uncertainty (Shannon, 1948, en-
tropy). Reduction in uncertainty is considered information
about the true category. In sequential search tasks, step-
wise (greedy) procedures are not in general optimal.
As descriptive models, information gain and related opti-
mal experimental design ideas (like probability gain and im-
pact)havebeenused topredict questions onavarietyof tasks
(Austerweil &Grifﬁths, 2011;Eimas, 1970;Markant&Gurec-
kis, 2012;Meder&Nelson, 2012;Nelson, 2005, 2008;Nelson,
McKenzie, Cottrell,&Sejnowski, 2010;Nelson, Tenenbaum,&
Movellan, 2001; Oaksford&Chater, 1994; Oaksford&Chater,
2003), to predict human eye movements (Bicknell, 2011;
Legge, Klitz, & Tjan, 1997; Meier & Blair, 2013;Najemnik &
Geisler, 2005; Nelson & Cottrell, 2007; Walker Renninger,
Coughlan, Verghese, & Malik, 2005), and to predict ﬁring of
individual neurons (Nakamura, 2006).oth environments, stepwise information gain and the split-half heuristic
, Gender is the most informative ﬁrst question; in the Nonrepresentative
n word for beard, Bart, refers to various kinds of facial hair including a full
timal (shortest expected path length) search trees for the Representative
right), as identiﬁed through exhaustive search. In the question trees, if the
ght branch.
1 The German word Bart was used in the experiment; it refers to various
kinds of facial hair including a full beard (Vollbart), mustache (Schnurr-
bart), chin-only beard (Kinnbart), or goatee (Ziegenbart).
2 In this case, the Huffman (1952) code identiﬁes the optimal tree, and
exhaustive search is not required.
76 J.D. Nelson et al. / Cognition 130 (2014) 74–80In the Person Game each of the n persons is equally
probable in the beginning. Let nyes denote the number of
faces which have a particular feature, and nno denote the
number of faces that lack that feature. The information
gain (IG) of a question Q about that feature is:
IGðQÞ ¼ log2 n 
nno
n
log2 nno þ
nyes
n
log2 nyes
h i
ð1Þ
Information gain is deﬁned in terms of a weighted aver-
age of logarithms. Are there simple strategies that could
identify the highest-information-gain question? Consider
the split-half heuristic. It ﬁnds a feature that comes closest
to being possessed by half of the remaining individuals,
and asks about that feature. Importantly, it can be proven
that in the Person Game the split-half heuristic always
chooses the highest-information-gain question (Navarro
& Perfors, 2011). This ﬁnding contributes to a body of re-
search showing that heuristic information-acquisition
strategies can approximate (Gigerenzer & Gasissmaier
2011; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Markant & Gureckis, 2012;
Slowiaczek, Klayman, Sherman, & Skov, 1992) or even
exactly implement (Nelson, 2005, 2009) particular statisti-
cal models. Previous studies have found varying rates of
use of the split-half strategy. Eimas (1970) found use of
the split-half strategy varied widely depending on the
number of target items, number of available constraint
questions, and saliency of stimuli. Among 2nd graders,
the proportion ranged from 0% to 19%; among college
students, from 13% to 75%.
1.2. Transfer effects and generalizable insight
Another important issue is whether intrinsically moti-
vating games can instill generalizable intuitions about
information-search strategies (‘‘learning by playing’’;
Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff, 2003). Siegler (1977) began to ex-
plore this, by randomizing the order of structurally homol-
ogous letter and number guessing games, with 13–14-
year-old children, in an experiment in which the use of
informative question strategies was speciﬁcally encour-
aged. Siegler found that playing a number game before-
hand led to improved performance on a letter game. He
hypothesized that ordinal relationships among the num-
bers are more apparent than ordinal relationships among
letters. We address whether positive transfer effects can
occur between non-structurally-homologous games, in 8–
10-year-old children, when instructions do not speciﬁcally
encourage use of informative strategies.
2. Experiment
Theoretically speaking, the immediate statistics of the
set of cards available should determine the questions that
are asked. However, it may not be easy to immediately
internalize the full joint distribution of persons and fea-
tures. This suggests that it would make sense for people’s
ideas of questions’ relative usefulness to be inﬂuenced in
part by their own prior experience with the statistics of
faces in the world. To address this, we examined search
behavior while manipulating the statistical structure of
the faces in the Person Game (the environment), and there-
fore the structure of the optimal question trees. We usedtwo statistical environments, a Representative Environment
(Fig. 1, top left), with the gender distribution approxi-
mately equal (10 men, 8 women) and a Nonrepresentative
Environment (Fig. 1, top right), in which the gender distri-
bution was highly skewed (16 men, 2 women).
We derived the globally-optimal question trees for each
environment through exhaustive search (Fig. 1, bottom). In
the Representative Environment, Gender is the most infor-
mative ﬁrst question. In the Nonrepresentative Environ-
ment, Beard (facial hair),1 which is not a very useful
question in the Representative Environment, is the best ﬁrst
question. The Nonrepresentative Environment is nonrepre-
sentative in the sense that both the Beard and Gender feature
proportions greatly differ from the real-world experiences of
the children in our experiment, who have experienced
roughly equal proportions of men and women, and only a
minority of men with beards (cf. Nelson, 2005, Table 13). In
both environments stepwise information gain and the split-
half heuristic identiﬁed the optimal question tree.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants and design
Participants were 60 fourth-grade children between age
8 and 10 (67% girls) from Ludwigsburg, Germany, who
were not familiar with the Guess Who (’Wer ist es?’, by
Hasbro) game from which the stimuli were taken. Factors
‘‘Person Game Environment’’ (Representative vs. Nonrep-
resentative) and ‘‘Order of Games’’ (Person Game First vs.
Number Game First) were manipulated between subjects.
2.1.2. Materials and procedure
Stimuli were printed on cards. For the Person Game the
cards showed 18 cartoon-like faces, placed in random
arrangement in front of the child (Fig. 1). The experimenter
explained that she would draw a random person from an
identical set of people (face cards) and that the child’s task
was to identify this target by asking as fewyes–noquestions
as possible about the person’s features. To make clear that
each card was equiprobable, in each round of the game the
cardswere shufﬂed face downanda randomtarget face card
was chosen. The experimenter also explained that if the
child needed help identifying a question, they could refer
to twenty available questions (physical features), which
were printed on a different set of cards and placed near to
the child. The face cards eliminated through a questionwere
turnedover by the child, if neededwith help from the exper-
imenter. Questioning continued until the target was identi-
ﬁed. Each child played ﬁve rounds of the Person Game.
To explore the feasibility of using games to instill general-
izable insight, we also included a non-structurally-homolo-
gous Number Game. The Number Game task was similar: to
identify a randomly selected integerbetween1and18, byask-
ing yes–no questions. 18 number cards were ordered in front
of the child. However, in the Number Game, arbitrary ques-
tions (pertaining to any subset of the numbers, e.g., ‘‘Is the
number7,8, or14?’’)wereallowed,2 andnocardswithpossible
Fig. 2. Average informational value (±SEM) of questions asked, on the Person Game and Number Game. At left, usefulness of all questions. At right,
usefulness of the ﬁrst questions. Children who had ﬁrst completed the Number Game asked higher-information-value questions on the Person Game (left
side). On both the left and right halves, the ﬁrst two sets of data points (Repres. and Nonrep. Environ.) are from the Person Game; the third set of data points
is from the Number Game. In the Person Game, the ﬁrst questions were more informative in the Representative Environment than in the Nonrepresentative
Environment. Optimal performance, denoted with the dotted lines, would correspond to scaled information gain of 1. Random performance is denoted with
dashed lines. Data were obtained by ﬁrst averaging each game for each child, then averaging all games for each child, and ﬁnally by averaging across
children. The random strategy information value was obtained through simulation of a strategy that picks at random from the list of 20 available constraint
questions. Including the hypothesis-testing (‘‘name’’) questions would reduce the information value of the random strategy. In the Number Game, arbitrary
questions were allowed. In general, where there are n items and all questions are allowed, there are (2n – 2)/2 informative and non-redundant possible
questions. With 18 numbers this entails 131,071 potentially informative and nonredundant questions. It is not clear what random strategy would be
equivalent to the Person Game random strategy, so no random performance is calculated for the Number Game.
3 When there are just two or three cards remaining, all informative
questions have the same usefulness. In both environments, simulations
show that the raw and scaled information gain of the random strategy
increases gradually as the number of remaining face cards decreases.
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times with random target numbers, for about 20 min.
3. Results
Because exhaustive search showed that stepwise infor-
mation gain identiﬁes the optimal question strategies in
these environments, we use information gain to quantify
questions’ usefulness. So that the best-available question al-
ways has a value of one, we report the scaled expected infor-
mation gain (Hattori, 2002;Oaksford&Chater, 2003),which
is obtained by dividing each available question’s informa-
tion gain by the information gain of the most informative
available question. Perfect use of the split-half heuristic
leads to scaled information gain of 1 on every question.
Children asked questions that were more useful than a
chance strategy, but less useful than the optimal strategy,
in both the Person Game and in the Number Game (Fig. 2).
Aggregate performance in the Person Game (M = .87,
Md = .88) andNumberGame (M = .85,Md = .92)was similar.
However, the Number Game performance spanned a much
wider range (SD = .17, range .38 to .996) than the Person
Game performance (SD = .05, range .74 to .98). An F test re-
vealed that the difference in variance is statistically reliable
(F(59, 59) = 11.05, p < .0001); bootstrap sampling (which is
robust to nonnormality) corroborated this result.
On the Person Game, children who had ﬁrst played the
Number Game asked higher-usefulness questions than
children who played the Person Game ﬁrst (t(58) = 2.67,
two-tailed p = .01, Cohen’s d = 0.69). There was no transfer
from the Person Game to the Number Game (p = .83).
Did children’s search behavior adapt to the statistical
structure of each Person Game environment? While per-
formance was high in both environments (Fig. 2), therewas a trend to ask higher-usefulness questions in the Rep-
resentative Environment (t(58) = 1.66, two-tailed p = .1,
d = 0.43). To explore this trend, we analyzed children’s
search separately with respect to the ﬁrst question asked,
and for the other questions. From a normative perspective,
the ﬁrst question is the most important.3
When the ﬁrst questions were excluded, questions’
mean scaled information gain did not differ between envi-
ronments (MRepresentative = .89 vs. MNonrepresentative = .90;
p = .28). It thus appears that aggregate differences between
environments were driven by the ﬁrst question. Children
asked higher-usefulness ﬁrst questions in the Representa-
tive Environment than in the Nonrepresentative Environ-
ment (t(58) = 3.82, p = .0003, d = 0.99; Fig. 2, right). The
Spearman rank correlation between ﬁrst question fre-
quency and objective usefulness was .75 in the Representa-
tive Environment and .53 in the Nonrepresentative
Environment. In each task environment the most informa-
tive ﬁrst question was the most frequent ﬁrst question
(Fig. 3). Adaptation to the statistical structure of the task
environment was seen from the ﬁrst round of the game
(Fig. 4). Learning from experience over repeated games
was not required for that adaptation, although there may
be a learning trend across the ﬁve rounds of the game.
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of ﬁrst questions for each
environment, relative to the questions’ objective useful-
ness values. Gender was strongly preferred in the Repre-
sentative Environment (55% of ﬁrst questions), in which
it is objectively most useful, but was also popular in the
78 J.D. Nelson et al. / Cognition 130 (2014) 74–80Nonrepresentative Environment (24% of ﬁrst questions),
where it has low information value. The Beard question
was seldom asked in the Representative Environment (4%
of ﬁrst questions), even though it tied for second-most-
useful, but was the most frequent ﬁrst question in the Non-
representative Environment (25% of ﬁrst questions), where
it was the most useful question.Fig. 3. First questions asked in the Representative Environment (top) and the No
IG = information gain. In each condition children received the same list of 20 co
name questions (Theo, Herman) were asked a total of three times, although the4. Discussion
We observed a positive transfer effect from the Number
Game to the Person Game. This shows that the games do
not have to be structurally homologous for a facilitative
transfer effect to occur, even among 4th grade children. Fu-
ture research should explore a broad set of interventionsnrepresentative Environment (bottom). Split = initial feature distribution;
nstraint questions. In the Representative Environment, hypothesis-testing
name questions were not included in the set of suggested questions.
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Fig. 4. Proportion of Gender and Beard questions as ﬁrst question in the two environments of the Person Game, in each round of the game. The data indicate
strong effects of adaptation to the environment; these effects are apparent from the very ﬁrst round of the game. The Gender question was much more
frequent in the Representative Environment than in the Nonrepresentative Environment, and the Beard question was much more frequent in the
Nonrepresentative Environment than in the Representative Environment.
4 We thank Reviewer 2 for suggesting this analysis. Note that in the case
of nonequal priors, Eq. (1) cannot be used, but the general deﬁnition of
information gain (Cover & Thomas, 1991; Nelson, 2005) still applies.
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ferent physical arrangements of cards, etc.) to enhance
attainment of generalizable insights.
We found that information search was more efﬁcient in
a task environment that was representative of children’s
real-world experiences. Our results suggest key issues for
further theory and model development.
Questions of varying information gain were asked.
Could explore-exploit strategies, such as epsilon greedy
or softmaxing (Sutton & Barto, 1998), together with the
information value of the questions, explain this? These
strategies entail occasional or proportional selection of
low-information-value questions, and may be an impor-
tant component of a full theory. However, they cannot ex-
plain why certain questions (e.g., Hat in both
environments, Gender in the Nonrepresentative Environ-
ment) were much more prominent than other similarly
low-information-value questions.
Does salience explain the results? Unfortunately, sal-
ience is an umbrella idea that encompasses many ﬁndings.
In eye movement experiments, features may become sali-
ent because of abstract physical properties (Itti & Baldi,
2006), or because they have been useful previously (Nelson
& Chenkov, 2010). In our experiment, questions could also
be popular because of additional goals—such as differenti-
ating between male and female, which correspond to sta-
ble conceptual categories—that are beyond the current
modeling framework.
Perhaps the simplest explanation in the case of the Gen-
der question is that the Nonrepresentative Environment
statistics only partially overcame children’s real-world
experiences. Suppose that a child assumed that 31% of
the faces were female, halfway between the true 11% base
rate and the psychologically plausible 50%. In this case the
Spearman rank correlation between ﬁrst question fre-
quency and the scaled information gain would increaseto .73 in the Nonrepresentative Environment, similar to
the correlation in the Representative Environment.4 It is
thus possible that the perceived proportion of female faces
became closer to the true task statistics over repeated
games, but that this shift was not dramatic enough to be
apparent in the data.
What are the implications? Most, but not all, of the
above accounts imply that experiments with novel, artiﬁ-
cial stimuli will understate the efﬁciency of information
search in the wild. It is therefore important to learn the ex-
tent to which each of these explanations is correct. Natu-
ralistic stimuli, the relative representativeness of which
can be manipulated, were required for the manipulation
in the present study. To differentiate among the alternate
explanations, however, future experiments should orthog-
onally manipulate physical feature salience, individual
subjects’ learning history, and the statistics of the immedi-
ate task environment.
4.1. Final thoughts
Both theoretical issues in the study of information
acquisition, and the design of future experiments, stand
to gain from bringing sequential search experimental par-
adigms from developmental experiments and statistical in-
sights together. We used exhaustive search to ﬁnd that in
our Person Game tasks the split-half heuristic does in fact
identify the most efﬁcient question strategies. However,
this is not the case in general (Hyaﬁl & Rivest, 1976).
What search goals do people have if there is an
unavoidable tradeoff between long-run efﬁciency and
near-term information value? Meier and Blair (2013)
80 J.D. Nelson et al. / Cognition 130 (2014) 74–80found that people preferred a globally-more-efﬁcient strat-
egy, even if it entailed getting less information in the ﬁrst
query, in a situation in which a maximum of three queries
were needed. In future research, one key theme to explore
is whether, when, and how people identify efﬁcient strate-
gies in more complex sequential search tasks in which
stepwise methods are suboptimal.
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